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STA TE OF 1'.TEW YORK - BOARD OF PARO LE 
ADMINISTRATIVE A PPEAL DECISION NOTICE 








Chery I Kates Esq. 
P.O. Box 734 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Fairport, New York 14450 
04-145-20 B 
April 2020 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 20 
months. 
Drake, Davis 
Appellant's Letter-brief received August 25, 2020 
Appellant's Supplemental Letter-briefreceived October 14, 2020 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. · 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to _ __ _ 
Commissioner 
~  T / ' /'~ ; ~-.... -.7- ~A ffi 
r-- .... _~ J...!r4<£.~ L Affirmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
/ Co~issioner ~~/JVFP Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Uni4 written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on Id.Id h ocJ() 66' 
. . . } , 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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   Appellant challenges the April 2020 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 20-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved him being the head of a major narcotics 
selling organization. At the moment of his arrest, police seized large amounts of heroin, cocaine, 
marijuana, and a semi-automatic pistol and two revolvers. Appellant raises the following issues: 
1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the 
Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the statute requires 
the Board to consider the “length” of a sentence under the revised Rockefeller drug laws, and not 
just the “structure.”  3) in the transcript, the Board gets the convictions and sentences wrong. 4) 
the Board used erroneous information concerning his criminal history, the COMPAS, and his local 
jail time. 5) the Board didn’t have the sentencing minutes from his pending Florida sentence and 
federal sentence, and the sentencing minutes from this case are illegible. 6) the Board didn’t have 
his entire parole packet. 7) the Board didn’t have letters from the defense lawyers from the cases 
in Florida and the federal government. 8) community opposition was not discussed, nor were 
letters released, and they can contain erroneous information and can’t be considered. 9) a 
Commissioner was switched for this interview-showing predetermination. 10) he has sentences 
still to be served in two other jurisdictions, so the denial is not warranted. 11) the decision illegally 
resentenced him. 12) the decision lacks detail. 13) the Board failed to list any facts in support of 
the statutory standard cited. 14)  the decision is based upon personal opinion. 15) the Board asked 
about crimes he was never convicted of. 16) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments 
to the Executive Law, and the 2017 regulations, in that there is a presumption of release, the laws 
are evidence and rehabilitation based, and no individualized reason was given for a departure. 
Also, the COMPAS had errors. 17) the 20 month hold is excessive. 
 
   Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
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415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
   Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other 
appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered.  Matter 
of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). 
Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not 
be given equal weight.  Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 
156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
   The fact that the inmate committed the instant offense while on community supervision is a proper 
basis for denying parole release.  See, e.g., Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 A.D.3d 1586-87, 1586, 
992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Guzman v. 
Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 2006). 
   The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
   The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Espinal v. New 
York Bd. of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019) (COMPAS instrument 
yielded mixed results); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 
2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance abuse relevant given use 
before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) 
(low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related crimes); Matter of 
Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(scores not uniformly low including family support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 
(2017).   
   The Board may emphasize the inmate’s failure to take responsibility for the criminal offense. Cruz 
v Alexander, 67 A.D.3d 1240, 890 N.Y.S.2d 656 (3d Dept. 2009); Abdur-Raheem v New York State 
Board of Parole, 78 A.D.3d 1412, 911 N.Y.S.2d 257 (3d Dept. 2010); Khatib v New York State 
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Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Crawford v New York State 
Board of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016). 
   The Board clearly was well aware of the Rockefeller Drug Law changes to the original criminal 
sentence. That the decision used the word structure, instead of length, is irrelevant, as the matter was 
considered. 
 
   As for the allegations of erroneous descriptions of the convictions in the interview and his criminal 
history, none of the alleged errors appear in the final decision. Erroneous information, if not used in 
the decision as a basis for parole denial, will not lead to a reversal.  Matter of Khatib v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Restivo v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1096, 895 N.Y.S.2d 555 (3d Dept. 2010) [status report]; 
Matter of Grune v. Bd. of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007)[status 
report]; see also Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017) 
[misstatement by commissioner in interview that inmate did not correct]; Matter of Perea v. 
Stanford, 149 A.D.3d 1392, 53 N.Y.S.3d 231 (3d Dept. 2017) [erroneous information in PBR 
which inmate corrected during interview].    
   As for the alleged COMPAS errors, this was not raised by appellant during the interview. As 
appellant failed to raise an objection to the complained of fact at the parole interview, this claim 
has not been preserved.  Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d 
Dept. 2011); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000) 
(“Although the record reveals that petitioner objected to the use of two-way television for his 
interview in a letter written… to respondent, no objection was expressed at the parole hearing”). 
   The local jail time score is not erroneous, as the local jail time spent by appellant after his arrest 
was credited to his prior sentence.  
   The sentencing minutes are not illegible. And the Board is not required to have the sentencing 
minutes from other jurisdictions. 
   The parole packets were received and thoroughly reviewed, as is evident from the questions 
during the interview. 
   The letter from the criminal defense lawyer was in the file and reviewed. The Board is not 
required to seek letters from the criminal defense lawyers in other jurisdictions. 
   Community opposition letters have been sent to appellant’s lawyer. The Board decision doesn’t 
give community opposition as a reason for the denial, so this issue is moot.  
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   There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000). There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
2000). Nor was any penal philosophy discussed. Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption 
that the Board complied with its duty. See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 
A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985). 
 
   That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 
920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale). 
   The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
   Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Nichols, Lorenzo DIN: 88-A-1701  
Facility: Clinton CF AC No.:  04-145-20 B 
    
Findings: (Page 5 of 8) 
 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
   An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of 
a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 
99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New 
York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create 
a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-
76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of 
Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
   Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on 
which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018). Parole release is a statutory grant of a restricted form of liberty prior to the 
expiration of a sentence. Johnson v Superintendent Adirondack Correctional Facility, 174 A.D.3d 
992, 106 N.Y.S.3d 408 (3d Dept. 2019). 
   The Board decision is based exclusively upon the statutory factors, and not upon personal 
opinion. 
   The Board in the interview may ask about uncharged crimes. However, the decision doesn’t 
contain any language to that effect. 
   One Commissioner did recuse herself from participation in this case due to a potential conflict 
of interest.  
        The fact that a grant of parole in New York would not lead to appellant’s release, but rather, 
the beginning a lengthy prison sentence in another jurisdiction, does not mean a Board denial is 
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irrational bordering on impropriety. Perez v Evans, 76 A.D.3d 1130, 907 N.Y.S.2d 701 (3d Dept. 
2010). 
   Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
    In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
    Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments 
have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
   The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. 
   Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) also did not create a presumption in favor of release when 
scores on a periodically-validated risk assessment instrument are low.  “The creation of any such 
presumption is a legislative function and would conflict with the requirements of Executive Law 
§ 259-i.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.   The amended regulations also do not 
alter how the Board considers the COMPAS instrument.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 
2017 at 2 (reaffirming “any [risk and needs] instrument used is not dispositive”).   The COMPAS 
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does not (and cannot) supersede the Board’s authority to determine, based on members’ independent 
judgment and application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)’s factors, whether an inmate should be released.  
See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 
981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The new regulation was intended to increase transparency in the Board’s 
decision making by providing an explanation if a decision denying release was impacted by a 
departure from any scales within the COMPAS instrument.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 
2017 at 2. 
 
   Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do 
not represent an evidence/rehabilitation-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the 
fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the 
statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any 
substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration 
process.  In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and 
needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–
c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of 
Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter 
of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter 
of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 
1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was 
never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs 
information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, 
the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case 
review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive 
Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The 
amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply 
when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. 
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). 
 
   The decision is consistent with amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as there is no departure to 
explain.  That is, the Board’s decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale within the 
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assessment. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.   In fact, the Board cited the COMPAS 
instrument in its denial and reasonably indicated concern about the high scores therein. 
   In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed.   
Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 
2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 
Westchester Co. 2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
